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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
 *The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
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Petitioner Todd Langford appeals the District Court’s 
order denying his motion to unseal portions of a judicial record 
containing the terms of a confidential settlement agreement.  We 
will affirm. 
I 
 This action began in 2005, when LEAP Systems, Inc. 
(LEAP), an insurance licensor, sued Norman Baker, a licensee 
affiliated with the company, and Baker’s new employer, 
MoneyTrax, Inc. (MoneyTrax).  LEAP sought damages for, 
inter alia, misappropriations of proprietary and confidential 
information, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.  
The District Court held a settlement conference on March 25, 
2008, at which the parties reached two separate settlement 
agreements, one between LEAP and Baker, and the other 
between LEAP and MoneyTrax.  These agreements settled all 
outstanding disputes among the parties. 
 To ensure that the settlement agreements “would not fall 
apart as soon as the parties left the courthouse,” Baker’s attorney 
asked to read into the record the terms of the agreements.   At 
approximately 6:30 that evening, after all the court reporters had 
left for the day, District Judge Freda Wolfson brought the parties 
to the courtroom of Magistrate Judge Tonianne Bongiovanni, 
which was equipped with audio recording capabilities.  
Although Judge Wolfson stated a number of times that the terms 
were being placed “on the record,” she ensured the parties that 
she would not file a transcript of the proceeding and suggested 
that no confidential terms be included in the parties’ proposed 
                                                                                                             
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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order to dismiss.  When the parties inquired as to whether the 
transcript from the proceeding would be sealed, Judge Wolfson 
explained that because the proceeding was “not being 
transcribed as part of a court document,” there would be no 
reason to seal its contents. 
 On April 4, 2008, the District Court dismissed the action 
with prejudice, “subject to the terms, conditions and provisions” 
of the parties’ settlement agreements.  The District Court 
expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ 
agreements, and ordered that the “terms of the Agreement[s] 
placed on the record on March 25, 2008 . . . not be made public 
and kept confidential until the Court has the opportunity to 
review a formal motion to seal.”  Leap Sys. v. Moneytrax, Inc., 
No. 05-1521 (D. N.J. April 4, 2008) (order dismissing with 
prejudice).  One week after the case was dismissed, LEAP filed 
a motion to seal pursuant to New Jersey District Court Local 
Civil Rule 5.3.
1
  LEAP’s attorney, Melissa Klipp, filed a 
declaration in conjunction with that motion, in which she 
averred that portions of the March 25, 2008 transcript contained 
“sensitive business information.”  She also claimed that 
“[d]isclosure . . .  would render LEAP at a tactical 
disadvantage,” and that “one of LEAP’s primary competitors 
                                                 
 
1
 Local Rule 5.3 states, in relevant, part: 
Any motion to seal or otherwise restrict public access 
shall be available for review by the public.  The motion 
papers shall describe (a) the nature of the materials or 
proceedings at issue, (b) the legitimate private or public 
interests which warrant the relief sought, (c) the clearly 
defined and serious injury that would result if the relief 
sought is not granted, and (d) why a less restrictive 
alternative to the relief sought is not available. 
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has already made direct requests to the Court seeking the 
information on the tape recording.”  Sealing those portions of 
the transcript containing confidential proprietary information, 
Klipp declared, “would be the least restrictive means of 
protecting LEAP against imminent harm.”  Neither Baker nor 
MoneyTrax opposed LEAP’s motion to seal. 
 On May 9, 2008, the District Court entered an order 
sealing those portions of the transcript memorializing the terms 
of the parties’ settlement agreements.  Recognizing that “the 
right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute,” the 
District Court considered whether LEAP had satisfied its burden 
under Local Rule 5.3 of showing that a seal was necessary to 
protect its legitimate interests.  Leap, No. 05-1521 (D.N.J. May 
9, 2008) (order to seal) (citing Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)).  The Court found 
that LEAP’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of 
sensitive business information was legitimate, and that LEAP 
was reasonably concerned that competitors would use this 
information to its disadvantage.  It thus concluded that LEAP 
had met its burden, and ordered the record sealed.  The District 
Court also noted that the transcript was “only meant to serve as a 
reference for the parties when they drafted the actual 
agreements” and was not a part of the judicial record.  Id.  
Nevertheless, on May 27, 2008, the transcript was filed with the 
Clerk of Court for the District of New Jersey. 
 Within a month, the parties had resumed litigation, and 
the District Court entered three consecutive show-cause orders 
directing LEAP to comply with the terms of its settlement 
agreement with Baker.  In response, LEAP claimed that Baker 
had misappropriated confidential proprietary information and 
used it to develop a “software calculator” with his friend and 
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colleague Todd Langford.  Although LEAP eventually settled its 
dispute with Baker, it continued to pursue its misappropriation 
claim against Langford in state court.  Langford in turn filed a 
motion to intervene in the District Court proceeding and to 
unseal, under the “right of access” doctrine, portions of the 
March 25, 2008 transcript, which he claims are essential to 
establishing his defense in state court.  The Magistrate Judge 
granted Langford’s motion to intervene, but denied him access 
to the sealed portions of the transcript.  Citing the District 
Court’s order of May 9, 2008, the Magistrate Judge found that 
the transcript was not a “judicial record,” and thus “[n]either 
Langford nor any other member of the public has a legitimate 
right” to access it.  Leap, No. 05-1521 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2009) 
(letter order from magistrate judge). 
 The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation but rejected its finding that the transcript was 
not a judicial record.  By placing the terms of the settlement 
agreements on the record, the Court explained, the parties had 
transformed a private contract into a public document.  Leap, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53167, *19-20 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2009) 
(citing Jackson v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 224 F. Supp. 2d 834, 
839 (D.N.J. 2002)).  The Court also noted that a “presumptive 
right of access” arose when the document was filed with the 
Clerk of Court on May 27, 2008.  Id. at *20 (citing Leucadia v. 
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.3d 157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
 Nevertheless, the District Court found that LEAP’s 
interest in preventing competitors from using the proprietary 
information in the transcript to “unfairly compete,” coupled with 
its reliance on the Court’s assurance of confidentiality, 
outweighed Langford’s personal interest in litigating his claim 
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in state court.  Id. at *22-30.  Accordingly, the Court denied 
Langford’s motion to unseal those portions of the transcript 
containing the terms of the settlement agreements.  Langford 
filed this timely appeal.  
II 
 We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review its denial of 
Langford’s motion to unseal for abuse of discretion.  Pansy v. 
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal 
determination regarding the definition and scope of a “judicial 
record.”  Id. 
A 
 Langford sought to unseal portions of the March 25, 2008 
transcript pursuant to his common law right of access to judicial 
proceedings and judicial records, a right which we have held is 
“beyond dispute.”  Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 
(3d Cir. 1988).  The common law right of access antedates the 
Constitution, and its purpose is to “promote[] public confidence 
in the judicial system by enhancing testimonial trustworthiness 
and the quality of justice dispensed by the court.”  Id.  Hence, a 
“strong presumption” in favor of accessibility attaches to almost 
all documents created in the course of civil proceedings.  See 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 
1984) (“Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, 
plays an important role in the participation and the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.”); United States v. Martin, 
746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The common law right of 
access is not limited to evidence, but rather encompasses all 
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judicial records and documents.  It includes transcripts, 
evidence, pleadings, and other materials submitted by litigants . . 
. ”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 An exception is made, however, for documents which 
have not been “filed with, . . .  interpreted or enforced by the 
district court.”  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 781.  For instance, settlement 
agreements reached without court assistance or intervention will 
not be treated as “judicial records” for purposes of the “right of 
access” doctrine.  Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20-21 
(3d Cir. 1993); cf., Bank of Am. & Nat’l Trust v. Hotel 
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Once a 
settlement is filed in the district court, it becomes a judicial 
record, and subject to the access accorded such records.”).  
Moreover, a confidential settlement agreement will not be 
transformed into a “judicial record” simply because the court 
seals its contents from public view.  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 781. 
 The District Court initially stated that the sealed 
document was not a judicial record.  Upon closer review, 
however, the Court determined that the transcript, which had 
been recorded in open court, transcribed and filed with the Clerk 
of Court, and enforced in subsequent litigations, must be 
regarded as a judicial document for purposes of determining the 
public’s right of access.  We agree. 
 In Rittenhouse, we held that “the court’s approval of a 
settlement or action on a motion are matters which the public 
has the right to know about and evaluate.”  800 F.2d at 344.  
Thus, “settlement documents can become part of the public 
component of a trial” under either of two circumstances: (1) 
“when a settlement is filed with a district court;” and (2) “when 
the parties seek interpretative assistance from the court or 
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otherwise move to enforce a settlement provision.”  See 
Enprotech, 983 F.2d at 20 (citing Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 343-
44). 
 Both circumstances are present in this case.  The 
transcript was filed with the Clerk of Court on May 27, 2008, 
and listed as Document No. 54 on the District Court’s docket.2  
In addition, the parties specifically requested at the March 25, 
2008 proceeding that the District Court retain jurisdiction to 
interpret and enforce the terms of the settlement agreements.  
See Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345 (“Having undertaken to utilize 
the judicial process to interpret the settlement and to enforce it, 
the parties are no longer entitled to invoke the confidentiality 
ordinarily accorded settlement agreements.”).  In its order of 
dismissal, the District Court specifically directed compliance 
with the “terms, conditions and provisions” of the parties’ 
agreements.  Cf. Enprotech,  983 F.2d at 21 (finding no right of 
access to a settlement agreement where the court order referred 
to “the parties’ stipulation of dismissal and not their compliance 
with the terms and conditions of . . . [their] settlement 
agreement”).  Although the MoneyTrax-LEAP agreement has 
                                                 
 
2
 LEAP claims a copy of the transcript was filed with the 
Clerk by mistake and has since been removed from the docket.  
In Littlejohn, we held that discovery documents which were 
once filed with the court lost their status as “judicial records” 
when they were returned to counsel after the case was 
dismissed.  851 F.2d at 682.  Unlike in Littlejohn, here, the facts 
regarding when and where the document was filed remain in 
dispute.  We find no clear error, however, in the District Court’s 
reliance on docket entry number 54, which states that the 
transcript of the March 25, 2008 proceedings “is maintained in 
paper format on file in the Clerk’s Office.” 
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yet to be revisited, the District Court has demonstrated its 
willingness to enforce the Baker-LEAP agreement on several 
occasions. 
 Lastly, we are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002), that 
“the public has an interest in knowing what terms of settlement a 
federal judge would approve and perhaps therefore nudge the 
parties to agree to.”  Id. at 929.  Judges play an essential role in 
the settlement process, as “litigants may negotiate with more 
confidence if they know that a neutral third party, namely the 
judge presiding over their case, will look over the settlement 
agreement and note any ambiguities or other flaws in it that 
might frustrate or complicate its enforcement should the parties 
ever come to blows over its meaning.”  Id.  Indeed, the facts of 
this case perfectly illustrate the point.  Before Judge Wolfson’s 
intervention, the parties had engaged in two years of “bitterly 
contested” pre-trial practice, followed by a year of mediation.   
“Only after [the District] Court’s intervention and assistance[] 
did the parties finally agree[] to a set of specific terms.”  Leap, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53167 at *19.  Although the District 
Court’s involvement in the negotiation process may not by itself 
have transformed the confidential settlement agreements into 
publicly-available judicial documents, it certainly weighs in 
favor of this outcome. 
 For these reasons, the District Court did not err when it 
held that the transcript is a judicial document subject to the 
common law “right of access” doctrine. 
B 
 Although the right of access to judicial records is 
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“beyond dispute,” it is not absolute.  Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).  “Every court has 
supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has 
been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for 
improper purposes.”  Id.  Thus, while we recognize a strong 
presumption in favor of public accessibility, we also permit the 
sealing of documents when justice so requires.  However, “[t]he 
burden is on the party who seeks to overcome the presumption 
of access to show that the interest in secrecy outweighs the 
presumption.”   In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 Langford claims the District Court abused its discretion 
in denying him the right to access a judicial record based on 
little more than LEAP’s vague assertions that the transcript 
contains “secretive business information,” and that disclosure 
would “render LEAP at a tactical disadvantage.”  We agree that 
LEAP’s “[b]road allegations of harm, bereft of specific 
examples or articulated reasoning,” are insufficient, on their 
own, to establish a strong interest in maintaining confidentiality. 
 In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194.  Nor can a district court 
“rely on the general interest in encouraging settlement” to justify 
the sealing of an agreement which the parties mistakenly 
believed would remain confidential.  Id.; see also Rittenhouse, 
800 F.2d at 346 (“[T]he generalized interest in encouraging 
settlements does not rise to the level of interests that we have 
recognized may outweigh the public’s common law right of 
access.”). 
 Here, however, the District Court’s decision to deny 
Langford’s motion was based on more than LEAP’s broad 
assertions of financial injury and a generalized concern about 
discouraging settlement agreements.  Rather, the District Court 
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specifically found that LEAP would not have entered into the 
settlement agreements but for the Court’s assurance of 
confidentiality.  See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790 (finding that, in most 
cases, “settlements will be entered into . . . whether or not 
confidentiality can be maintained,” but that a party’s reliance on 
an order sealing a judicial document “should depend on the 
extent to which the order induced the party to allow discovery or 
to settle the case”). 
 The record provides ample support for the District 
Court’s finding.  As the transcript reflects, LEAP’s attorney 
asked the Court several times during the March 25, 2008 
proceeding whether the recording would remain confidential.  
The Court assured the parties that the transcript would not be 
filed and that the terms of the agreements would not be 
disclosed in its order dismissing the case.  When the parties 
asked whether the Court would seal the contents of the 
transcript, they were told that a sealing order would not be 
necessary to ensure the document’s confidentiality.  Under these 
circumstances, we find LEAP’s reliance on the District Court’s 
assurances of confidentiality entirely reasonable and sufficient 
to outweigh the public’s common law right of access.  See also 
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 
2004) (holding that the details of a confidential settlement 
agreement disclosed during “a relatively informal conference 
relating to settlement,” on the basis of the court’s “assurances of 
confidentiality,” warranted only a “weak” presumption of public 
access). 
 Having found LEAP’s privacy interest significant, we 
now turn to the public’s interest in disclosure.  “Circumstances 
weighing against confidentiality exist when confidentiality is 
being sought over information important to public health and 
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safety, and when the sharing of information among litigants 
would promote fairness and efficiency.”  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777 
(internal citations omitted).  Moreover, we are more likely to 
require disclosure when “a party benefitting from the order of 
confidentiality is a public entity or official,” or when the judicial 
record “involves matters of legitimate public concern.”  Id. at 
778, 788.  The District Court considered these factors, and 
found the public’s interest in disclosure minimal.  The parties 
are private entities, their dispute has no impact on the safety and 
health of the public, and their settlement agreements 
demonstrate a clear intent to maintain confidentiality. 
 Weighing these factors against LEAP’s strong privacy 
interest, the District Court held that the presumption in favor of 
public accessibility had been rebutted.  This finding was not an 
abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
